

Executive Summary

Toscafund and our consultant, Professor Richard Rose (a senior election expert and Director at the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde), produced insightful analyses before the 2015 General Election. There were few, if any, able to successfully and accurately predict the ensuing Conservative majority.

We are once again collaborating so that our discerning readers can anticipate the outcome of the 2017 General Election.

1. Theresa May is headed for a big victory – 397 Seats predicted

The election has been called because she wants a big majority for her policies rather than to administer a manifesto left behind by David Cameron. All the evidence shows that she should end up with an overall majority of more than 100 seats in Parliament and up to 400 MPs.

2. Labour headed for its worst defeat since 1935 – 169 Seats predicted

Even if Jeremy Corbyn wins a bigger vote than Michael Foot, changes in party competition will leave Labour with fewer MPs than in its disastrous 1983 election showing. Moreover, it will do well to finish less than 200 seats behind the Conservatives.

3. Liberal Democrat critics of Brexit will gain seats but little voice – 12 Seats predicted

There are only half a dozen seats where the pro-remain referendum vote was so high that it could help the party unseat an incumbent MP. Polling evidence shows little national swing to the party from 2015 and in seats where it is second it trails well behind the incumbent MP.

4. Scottish National Party chastened not stopped – 50 Seats predicted

Because it won 56 of Scotland’s 59 seats in the last election, the SNP is vulnerable to losing up to half a dozen to the anti-independence Conservatives. It will remain the party with the most Scottish votes and the third largest party at Westminster.

5. Brexit producing UKXIT, that is, a collapse in the vote of the UK Independence Party – No Seats predicted

More than half of those who gave UKIP their vote two years ago now favour the Conservatives. This will help the Tories win marginal seats from Labour, especially in constituencies in which UKIP does not field a candidate.

Chart 1: Party share of seats, Estimated outcome





Chart 2: Parliamentary majorities compared



Source: All election statistics calculated from House of Commons Briefing Paper, CBP7186, General Election 2015 and Polls estimated outcome as of the 13th May 2017

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Preface

Ahead of the 2015 General Election, Toscafund commissioned Professor Richard Rose to assess who, on the balance of probability and his considerable experience of psephology, would be our Prime Minister following the vote. In the series of reports we released Professor Rose essentially dismissed the probability of Ed Miliband taking office in No. 10 with or without the tacit support of the SNP. As we know David Cameron continued in his role, albeit in a more commanding position than we had expected. So much more commanding in fact that being unshackled by a coalition partner Cameron was committed to calling a referendum on EU membership. Indeed, the Prime Minister campaigned for 'Remaining', I will not dwell on what happened next other than to say it has been some experience.

This brings me to the approaching general election. We have once again drawn upon the experience of Professor Rose to prepare us for the most likely outcome on June 8th. The conclusion that the Conservative Party will extend its majority and lengthen its hold on office until 2022, gives me the chance to reaffirm my view that the UK's Brexit bargaining position will be strong. It's estimated that more than five-sixths of MPs will be elected on pro-Brexit manifestos and in the new Parliament, the most pro-EU parties, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats, will together have less than one-eighth of all MPs. This said professor rose's assessment is that the SNP will continue to dominate Scotland's Westminster seats, with Plaid Cymru gaining across Wales, but with neither having a real influence at Westminster. His conclusion helps reaffirm my view both will demand and get ever more devolved powers.

Before I conjecture on what sterling might do once the scale of the Conservative victory has become clear, let me point out that the announcement to seek an early election acted to lift its value. To my mind this was testament to the confidence of the currency market that Theresa May would extend her tenure as premier to 2022 and so add at least three years to the UK's economic life outside the EU. This said expectation is not certainty and I would anticipate another boost to sterling were the electoral predictions set out in this research to be realised. I would however stress that where the pound is heading beyond short term sentiment will be determined by structural economic factors. The greater the popular mandate the Prime Minister gets, so markets will infer the stronger will be her negotiating hand with the EU. This should help reassure those concerned that the hard rhetoric they have been hearing will translate into a hard Brexit. And any evidence which points to a conciliatory separation can only be good for all markets, both financial and those dealing in real goods and services.

Dr Savvas Savouri

Professor Richard Rose is the most senior practicing election expert in Britain; he co-authored his first two books on the 1959 British general election and has since published more than a dozen books on voting and elections in Britain, Europe and worldwide. As director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow he has also published dozens of books on comparative politics and public policy in Europe, the United States and beyond. For more details, see: www.cspp.strath.ac.uk.

1. WHY A GENERAL ELECTION?

A Prime Minister has more to lose than anyone else by calling a general election, because she or he already has the highest office in British government. With a Conservative majority of 98 seats over the Labour Party and a term of office not due to expire for three years, Theresa May had no fear of being upset by the official Opposition. Although the government has had a small majority, it would have taken a coalition of Conservative defectors and unity among MPs from up to eight Opposition parties to carry a vote of no confidence in the Conservative government.

Theresa May has called a general election on 8th June for three good reasons. Foremost is the desire to make the Conservative government her government rather than one elected on a manifesto prepared by David Cameron. Secondly, opinion polls and by-election results promise a June ballot will give her a big parliamentary majority. Thirdly, Theresa May needs a personal mandate for managing Britain's withdrawal from the European Union, because she voted remain in the EU referendum while most Conservative voters cast their ballot for leaving. Before the end of next year, the Prime Minister will need the approval of her Cabinet, and parliamentary party and both houses of Parliament for the terms she gets from Brussels before the UK ceases to be an EU member state in March, 2019. The terms may be for a hard Brexit, a soft Brexit, or no deal with Brussels.

Opinion polls promise that the Conservative lead in votes will widen thanks to the return from UKIP ranks of former supporters who welcome May's commitment to Brexit. Concurrently, Theresa May leads a party that UKIPpers recognise as their party. Labour under Jeremy Corbyn is finding it difficult to regain the votes and seats lost at the last general election. However, the number of seats gained for each one percent increase in votes does not automatically translate into a similar gain in seats. The Conservative lead of 6 percent lead in votes at the 2015 election produced a lead of less than 2 percent over opposition MPs.

Theresa May will benefit from the House of Commons having more of her MPs. Conservatives gaining seats from opposition parties are doing so by appealing for support for her as a strong leader in Brexit negotiations. The same is true of Conservative candidates replacing incumbent MPs who are retiring or, like George Osborne, leaving the Commons because they are out of favour with Downing Street. Re-elected Tory MPs who held or won their seats at the last election by sitting on the fence will return committed to the leader's slogan "Brexit means Brexit".

Up to a point, the manifesto on which the Prime Minister is fighting the general election will show what Brexit means by setting out red-line conditions that should be met by any agreement she will approve. The manifesto should also indicate what scope Downing Street sees for negotiations with the European Union. The Labour manifesto accepts the referendum result too. Together, these commitments give little encouragement to those who would like the next Parliament to call a second referendum on the terms of withdrawal after negotiations conclude next year.


2. COMPETING PARTIES

Winning a British general election outright requires a party to gain an absolute majority of the 650 seats in the House of Commons. Doing so does not require the victorious party to win a majority of the vote. No governing party has won an absolute majority of votes since 1935 because the total is divided among many competing parties. Since February, 1974, third parties, a term that lumps together Liberal Democrats, nationalist parties, Greens, UKIP and others, have regularly won between one-quarter and one-third of the national vote.

To win a seat in the British first-past-the-post electoral system requires a candidate to secure a plurality of votes in a constituency; that is, one more than any other candidate. At the 2015 general election, there was an average of six candidates per constituency. In consequence, the great majority of seats were won by an MP with a plurality rather than an absolute majority of votes. For example, in a four-way fight in the Welsh constituency of Ynys Mon, Labour won with only 31 percent of the vote.

The bias in the electoral system tends to give a disproportionate number of seats to the parties winning the most votes. As the party with a plurality of votes nationally in 2015, Conservatives enjoyed the biggest advantage; it gained its absolute majority in the Commons with just under 37 percent of the popular vote. Labour also benefited, albeit to a lesser degree, winning more than a third of MPs with less than a third of the popular vote (Chart 3).

Chart 3: The Relation of Votes and Seats, 2015 UK Election



Source: All election statistics calculated from House of Commons Briefing Paper, CBP7186, General Election 2015

The ability of a party to win seats depends on how its vote is spread among the UK's 650 constituencies. A party that wins a small share of the UK vote can win a disproportionate number of MPs if it concentrates its vote. The Scottish National Party consistently does just this. It won half the vote in Scotland in 2015, but because it does not contest seats outside Scotland, this was only 4.7 percent of the UK vote. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) suffered most, because its support has been spread relatively evenly throughout the country. Its 13 percent share of the national vote in 2015 won it only one MP. The Liberal Democrats are perennially penalized by the electoral system. At the last election the party's eight percent of the popular vote secured it just over one percent of Commons seats.

In today's multi-party system, the calculation of a uniform nationwide swing in votes between from Labour and the Conservatives is no longer a reliable guide to estimating seats changing hands, because general elections are no longer general. At the 2015 general election third parties won 88 seats, UKIP came second in 120 seats and the Liberal Democrats came second in dozens more.

Instead of party competition being uniform throughout the country, the competitive strength of parties differs between parts of the UK (Table 1). This is most evident in Northern Ireland, where 95 percent of the vote goes to a variety of Unionist and Irish Republican parties. In Scotland, five Unionist parties compete with the SNP. In Wales the two largest British parties take 64 percent of the vote but seats are divided among four parties. Party competition also varies within England. In the South of England, the Conservatives won more than double Labour's share of the vote and 247 seats against 51 for Labour at the last election. By contrast, in London the Labour Party won a plurality of votes and 45 of its 73 MPs. In the North of England Labour won 12 percent more of the vote than the Conservatives and took 110 seats against 44 for its Tory opponents .

Table 1: Party Competition Varies Within the UK

	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	UKIP	Green	Other	Nat	Seats
	(% votes 2015)							
South of England	47.2	23.5	9	15.1	4.4	0.8	0	302
London	34.9	43.7	7.7	8.1	4.9	0.8	0	73
North of England	30.7	43.1	6.7	15.0	3.4	1.0	0	158
Wales	27.2	36.9	6.5	13.6	2.6	1.0	12.1	40
Scotland	14.9	24.3	7.5	1.6	1.3	0.3	50.0	59
N. Ireland	1.3	0	0	2.6	0	1.0	95.1	18*
*Includes both Unionists & Irish Republican parties								

Source: All election statistics calculated from House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP7186, General Election 2015.

Notes: North of England regions: North East, North West and Yorkshire & Humberside. South of England: South East, South West and East.

The over and under representation of parties at the forthcoming election is already baked into the system. The Conservatives will again be substantially over-represented in the Commons and the same will be the case for the SNP. Labour's loss of seats will undermine its former over-representation. An increase in votes for the Liberal Democrats will once again leave the party with fewer seats than its national vote would entitle it to in a system of proportional representation .

3. WINNING VOTES

Political events since the last election have had an impact on support for all parties. In more than 160 polls taken since the last election, the Conservatives have consistently come first (see <http://UKpollingreport.co.uk>). Instead of experiencing a mid-term slump in support, the Conservatives have enjoyed a big mid-term boost. Immediately after the EU referendum, the Conservatives averaged a lead of only five percentage points over Labour. Once Theresa May became Prime Minister the Conservative lead over Labour grew to a double digit figure. In two polls taken a week before Theresa May announced the election, the Conservatives enjoyed a 21 percent lead over Labour. Under Jeremy Corbyn the Labour Party quickly suffered a drop in support from its vote at the 2015 election. Since then, Labour support has tended to be steady but it has yet to reach the point at which it lost the 2015 election. Concurrently, the Liberal Democrats have seen a small recovery in poll support. UKIP has suffered the biggest loss. Since the EU referendum delivered Brexit, its support has more than halved.

The boost in Conservative support reflects the party's capacity to hold on to its 2015 voters while simultaneously picking up supporters from other parties and from those who did not vote at the last election. In its latest Sunday Times poll, YouGov found that 89 percent who had voted Conservative in 2015 were ready to vote for the party again. Only 5 percent had defected to the Liberal Democrats and 4 percent to Labour. Of the fifth of voters that Labour has lost, three have gone Conservative for every two that have switched to the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats have lost 44 percent of their previous supporters and two-thirds of these defectors have gone to the Conservatives. As for UKIP, 69 percent who reported voting for the party at the last election say they will now vote Conservative compared to 23 percent intending to vote UKIP again. The small proportion of UKIP voters who have defected to Labour have not been replaced by Labour defections to UKIP.

Taken at its face value, the size of the Conservative lead explains why Theresa May saw little risk of losing the government's parliamentary majority by calling a June election. However, an election campaign creates a new situation. Questions about voting intentions become less hypothetical as Election Day approaches. During the election campaign, non-party groups and the media encourage every elector to vote as a civic duty. However, poll evidence indicating that the outcome is a foregone conclusion encourages the view that there is no point in bothering to vote. Moreover, local electioneering has drained the energies of many grass-roots party workers and internal party differences have demoralized Labour and UKIP activists.

By mid-May those who tell pollsters they are undecided now represent less than one-sixth of the electorate, according to the latest YouGov survey. Among the 6 percent of undecided who say which party they are inclined to favour, the Conservatives outnumber those inclined toward Labour by a margin of 4 to 3. Among those 9 percent who at present appear unlikely to vote, past party history indicates they almost evenly divided between the two biggest parties. Before Election Day, each of the party leaders is scheduled to make at least one television appearance. However, judgments of who has "won" a TV debate make a 24 hour headline reflecting prior partisan inclinations. It would take an extraordinary gaffe by a leader to disrupt how the parties are evaluated.

As the election campaign progresses more polls are published, with the result of creating more "noise", that is, changes in the support for the front-running parties that reflect random fluctuations of up to three percent, that are inevitable in the sampling procedures that polls use. When the fluctuations are in opposite directions, this creates the appearance of a change of up to five or six percent in the gap between the parties, even though there is actually no change in the electorate as a whole. A least squares regression line can indicate whether there has been a significant trend up or down in the 36 polls to date to since the election was called.

Chart 4: Trend in Party Support during the Campaign




Chart 4 plots the results of 36 nationwide polls taken since the general election was called on 18th April up to 13th May. The calculations show:

- Conservative support is high and steady. Because the party started out at a high level, the slight upward trend in support plotted in Chart 4 is not statistically significant. Since the election was called in mid-April, Conservative support has more or less randomly fluctuated between 40 and 50 percent. In the 11 most recent polls since the local elections of 4th May, the party's support has fluctuated between 44 and 49 percent.
- Labour has enjoyed a significant upward trend from 24 percent, its poll position when the election was called. The underlying trend since then has been an increase of 5.5 percent, bringing it close the position when it lost the 2015 general election. Since local elections, Labour's support in the polls has fluctuated between 27 and 32 percent.
- The Liberal Democrats' national support has fluctuated between 8 and 12 percent. There is an underlying trend downwards in its support and it is statistically significant. Its stance as the only party unambiguously in favour of maintaining close ties with the EU has not been a vote winner.
- UKIP's big fall in support started well before the general election was called and has followed a significant downward path since to 5 percent, with the prospect of a further fall in its national vote on Election Day because it is not fielding candidates in hundreds of constituencies.

4. TURNING VOTES INTO SEATS

The decisive question on election night is: how many seats has each party won? The answer cannot be read off from national opinion polls but only by adding up the results in 650 constituencies. Even though her power as Prime Minister is at risk, Theresa May can only contribute one seat, Maidenhead, to the total she needs for a good result; that is, substantially more seats than David Cameron had in 2015.

All parties target their campaign effort at marginal seats; these are conventionally defined as seats where their candidate finished second by 10 percent or less. In a complementary manner, they also offer additional support to incumbent MPs who hold or won their seat by a similar margin. As constituencies become socially and politically more homogeneous, the number of marginal seats has been contracting. At the forthcoming election, more than four-fifths of constituencies are held by a margin of more than ten percent.

If the Conservatives are to achieve a lead of more than 100 seats over the combined forces of all opposition parties, they will need to win nine-tenths of their 51 target seats (Table 2). If Labour is to avoid its worst result since 1983, it will need to hold all the vulnerable seats it is defending by a margin of more than five percent. If Labour wants to avoid dropping its representation below 200 MPs, it will need to hold all the marginal seats in which it has a lead of more than 7 percent. The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party are fighting wars on two fronts. The Liberal Democrats have more target seats they hope to gain because they did so badly at the last election, while being vulnerable to losing some of the 8 MPs they now have. The SNP is in the opposite situation: Only three of its seats are held by a margin of less than 10 percent and it is the challenger in three seats that its opponents hold by margins of less than 6 percent. Even though UKIP came second in 120 seats at the last election, there are only 3 seats in which it finished within 10 percent of an incumbent.

The Conservative and Liberal Democrat candidates have a special opportunity to appeal for cross-party support from voters who are dissatisfied with the position on Brexit of the party they supported at the last election. In England and Wales, a majority voted to leave the EU in 401 constituencies while 172 registered a majority for remaining. Nonetheless, in ten Conservative-held seats, more than 66 percent voted to remain in the EU. In only one Liberal Democrat seat was there a majority for Brexit, while in 16 of its target marginals there was a majority for remaining in the EU.

Table 2: Target and Vulnerable Seats of Parties

	Target (10% behind)	Vulnerable (10% or less ahead)
Con	51	57
Labour	48	49
Lib Dem	16	7
UKIP	3	0
SNP	3	6

Source: All election statistics calculated from House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP7186, General Election 2015

Because there are a multiplicity of candidates in every constituency, the winner took an absolute majority of the vote, thus making the sitting MP invulnerable to change if he or she can hold on to the support they had at the last election. In more than half their sets, 171, the incumbent Conservative MP had an absolute majority at the last election. By contrast, Labour MPs have an absolute majority of the vote in 107 seats, less than half their total. The SNP won 35 seats with more than 50 percent of the constituency vote, while the Liberal Democrats have only one seat that is so safe. In seats held by a plurality of the vote, it is arithmetically possible for a grand coalition of opponents to combine their votes behind one candidate and unseat an MP. However, national party headquarters are against formal pacts and so are many constituency activists. Nor is it necessary for this to be done, since voters can decide to vote tactically for their second best choice in order to prevent the party they most dislike winning. This is most likely to be effective in seats in which the sitting MP won with less than 40


percent of the vote two years ago. In 16 Conservative-held marginals the Tory MP took less than 40 percent of the vote, and the same is the case for 15 Labour MPs.

The outcome in marginal seats is determined by the net effect of the movement of voters between up to half a dozen parties contesting a constituency. Because of the variety of motivations and party choices on offer, most seats do not change hands because of a pendulum-like swing of Labour voters to Conservative ranks or vice versa. In the latest YouGov survey showing an 18 percentage point Conservative lead over Labour, less than one percent of the Tory advantage was due to the net effect of respondents saying they had switched between the two parties. Most of the net change in party support is due to shorter movements in and out of the Liberal Democratic ranks and the collapse of UKIP. For example, for every three voters the Conservatives have lost to the Liberal Democrats, they have won five from UKIP defectors.

In the 11 polls conducted after the 4 May local elections, the Conservatives have had the support of an average of 48 percent of respondents, compared to Labour averaging 30 percent (Chart 5). Conservative support has gone up so much more than Labour because it has been able to squeeze the vote of UKIP, and the Liberal Democrats have failed to make a significant national gain in support. Thus, the combined vote for third parties is likely to be under a quarter at the forthcoming election, instead of the customary third or more of the vote.

Assessing the likely change in the number of MPs that each party wins at the forthcoming election must take into account the margin by which a seat is currently held; the pattern of party competition in the constituency; and national support for each party. Because the forthcoming election is so near the previous ballot, the partisan effects of demographic changes in the electorate are slight. The combination of these influences is used to estimate the number of seats each party will win at the 8 June election, if no significant change occurs in opinion polls reported in Chart 5.

Chart 5: Party Support in Current Polls



Source: Means from 11 published British polls interviewing since local elections on 4th May. Since surveys do not include Northern Ireland, the change calculations are based on the 2015 division of the vote in Great Britain with an allowance for UKIP's failure to contest 247 seats.

Conservative opportunities. The uniform application of opinion poll estimates of the big increase in the Conservative vote and a slight fall in the Labour vote is that the party would win 56 seats in which it trailed the incumbent MP by 11 percent or less two years ago. Seven-eighths of these seats are held by Labour MPs. In a few seats a combination of three things: a large ethnic vote, a very high referendum vote for remaining in the EU, and a low UKIP vote in 2015 may enable some Labour MPs to hold on. However, in 13 of the 24 seats where the Conservatives are behind the incumbent by a margin of between 11 and 15 percent, the UKIP vote was above the share it won nationally two years ago. Moreover, in 15 of these constituencies the percentage vote for leaving the European Union was above the national figure, including 11 in which the vote to leave the EU was above 60 percent. Theresa May is specially targeting these Labour-held seats, many of which are in the North of England.

Corbyn's mixed impact. The Labour leader's strategy of mobilizing core trade union voters appears to have attracted enough fresh support to offset the loss the party incurred when he first became leader. Nor will it avoid a loss in seats that will bring Labour its fewest MPs since 1935. Among those who voted Labour in 2015, almost half have defected to other parties or to the ranks of the undecided. Moreover, Labour's confusing positions on the EU and devolution match the party's internal division between its metropolitan pro-EU supporters and anti-EU voters and devolved parties in Scotland and Wales and at Westminster. Thus, it is vulnerable to losing two seats to the Liberal Democrats, one to Plaid Cymru and its only Scottish seat.

Liberal Democrats still weak also-rans. The Liberal Democrat fall in votes was so great in 2015 that there are only 21 seats in which they finished second with as much as 30 percent of the vote and only three of its eight MPs were elected with two-fifths or more of the vote. In the seven seats the party is defending with margins of less than ten percent, the Conservatives are the chief challenger in three, Labour in two and the SNP and Plaid Cymru in the other seats. In all seven the UKIP vote was bigger than the Liberal Democrats margin of victory and few UKIP defectors will switch to the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats are thus likely to lose three of their MPs to the Conservatives.

The Liberal Democrats trailed a sitting MP by less than ten percent in only 16 constituencies. Of these notional marginal seats, 10 are Conservative-held, 3 are Labour and 3 are SNP. While the Liberal Democratic national share of the vote has recovered a bit since two years ago, the Conservative vote has risen even more. The party's best chance of making gains is in seats which voted heavily in favour of remaining in the EU at last year's referendum. A big student population helps the Liberal Democrats too. There are eight constituencies in which more than 60 percent voted for remaining in the EU, the party's distinctive appeal. In Scotland the Liberal Democrats are caught by having to compete with the SNP for voters who put the EU first, and with three other parties that are more firmly Unionist, specially a resurgent Conservative Party.

UKIP vote being cannibalized. UKIP's political success has undermined its electoral appeal. In campaigning for votes in 2015 it asked voters to send the Conservative-led government a message. Now that the government has adopted much of its message on Europe and on immigration, the party's *raison d'être* is in question. Moreover, Brexit will end the political careers of the 24 UKIP Members of the European Parliament. Political feuding and a rapid turnover of leaders has cost the party candidates too. UKIP is sure to see a big drop in its vote because it is fielding 247 fewer candidates than at the last election.

In the three seats in which UKIP came within ten percent of the winner, all were held by Conservatives. In Labour-held seats in which UKIP is within 15 percent of the sitting MP the Conservatives often finished second, thus giving UKIP voters an incentive to vote for the Conservatives in order to oust a Labour MP. In the great majority of seats in which UKIP polled more than 20 percent of the vote, they are either a distant second or trail behind both the Conservatives and Labour in third place. The chief impact of UKIP will be indirect. At least six of its defectors plan to vote Conservative for every one defecting to Labour, it will help the Conservatives win several dozen seats from Labour and shore up Conservative defences in seats their MPs held by a narrow margin at the last election.

For Wales, read England. The Principality is no longer the Labour heartland that it once was. Although 25 of the 40 constituencies in Wales are Labour held, in seven the party is defending margins of less than nine percent. Like England, party

Never before in my working life has a general election been contested by the 'main' Unionist Parties presenting such diametrically opposed visions for how the UK economy needs to be managed. And whilst both parties have new leaders from those who contested the 2015 General Election, where the Labour party sits on the political plane has shifted dramatically more than the move by the Conservative party. So even though the Tory manifesto does no longer contains a pledge not to raise income tax or national insurance or to reduce corporation tax, the Labour manifesto makes clear that taxes would rise in a steep 'progressive' way. Since Richard Rose makes clear a Labour win is impossible and a large Conservative majority almost certain I see no reason to conjecture on what Jeremy Corbyn as Prime Minister and John McDonnell as chancellor would mean for GDP, inflation, gilts and the pound amongst other economic and financial metrics for and of the UK. Suffice it to say the numbers would be sharply different from what we will see unfolding over coming years.


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competition is divided between north and south. Third parties, a combination of Plaid Cymru, UKIP, the Liberal Democrats and Greens, collectively took more than one-third of the vote at the 2015 election. The early May poll for the Cardiff University Welsh Governance Centre showed the Conservative support up 14 percent, helped greatly by the collapse of UKIP. The Labour vote was down by 2 percent. No significant change was indicated for the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru (see blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales). In the preceding pages the analysis of Welsh seats changing hands has been included along with that of English seats. In the seven marginal seats that Labour is defending, UKIP's above-average showing there in 2015 means Labour is vulnerable to losing six seats to the Conservatives and one is very vulnerable to Plaid Cymru. That would leave Labour in its worst position in Wales in almost a century.

Scotland will remain different. In the June general election, the Scottish National Party will retain its position as the biggest party in Scotland by winning the largest share of the vote. With a projected 50 of Scotland's 59 MPs it will also be the third largest party in the Westminster Parliament. Three Scottish surveys in April show that Conservative support has doubled since the last election, albeit from a very low figure of 15 percent in 2015. The SNP vote has gone down an average of 7 percent. Different forms of party competition in Scotland make it unsuitable to apply a national Scottish survey uniformly to every seat. There were only six seats that the SNP is defending in which it has a lead of less than 10 percent. The collapse of Labour in Scotland and aggressive campaigning by the Conservatives Scottish leader, Ruth Davidson, will see it replace Labour as the second largest party in terms of Scottish votes and seats.

Half-way through the election campaign, the overall picture is clear: On current figures, Theresa May is headed for a majority of more than 225 seats over Labour and at least 140 seats over all MPs (Chart 6). This will be as big a victory as Margaret Thatcher secured in 1983. Unless there is last minute reversal in public opinion, May will have a larger share of the popular vote than Thatcher achieved in winning 397 seats when trouncing Michael Foot in 1983.

Chart 6: What it All Adds Up To: Party Share of Seats



Source: All election statistics calculated from House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP7186, General Election 2015 and Polls estimated outcome as of the 13th May 2017

5. THE FALLOUT FROM THE RESULT

Whatever the exact number of MPs each party gains, Theresa May is on track to secure what she wants: a majority of MPs committed to her leadership. This will give her support for whatever she decides is a good deal for Britain after confronting European Union leaders with a different mandate for Europe's post-Brexit relations with Britain.

The drop in Labour representation will be less significant than what follows. The choice is between keeping Labour on the leftward path that Jeremy Corbyn and those behind him have taken or heading in a direction in which more votes and seats may be won.

Liberal Democrats will be anxious spectators of developments beyond their control. To regain significance they will need a big bang event, such as an anti-Brexit backlash or a break-up among Labour MPs because of the consequences of the party's move left.

As the party with control of the Scottish government, a big plurality of Scotland's Westminster vote and a big majority of its MPs, the Scottish National Party will press on with its demand for a second referendum on independence in the life of the new UK Parliament.

Devolution revolution

Across England there are now six newly elected “metro mayors”, each hoping to one day wield power equivalent to the Mayor of London and the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales. In Greater Manchester it was Labour’s Andy Burnham who was victorious, a former Secretary of State for Health and to some, a man who could have become Prime Minister. Over in the West Midlands it was Andy Street of the Conservative Party who was elected. Although with no notable political experience he had formerly been managing director of the commercially unique John Lewis Partnership. Here is a full list of the mayoral winners.

Table 1: UK’s newly elected Metro Mayors

Region	Mayor	Party	Prior experience	Regional details
Greater Manchester	Andy Burnham	Labour	MP, former Health Secretary	Area of 493mi ² Population of 2.8m
Liverpool City Region	Steve Rotheram	Labour	MP for Liverpool Walton	Area of 280mi ² Population of 1.5m
West Midlands	Andy Street	Conservatives	Formerly managing director of John Lewis	Consists of Birmingham and surrounding towns like Coventry, Wolverhampton Population of 2.4m
West of England	Tim Bowles	Conservatives	Local councillor, worked for ‘exhibition solutions’ company rth	Consists of Bristol metropolitan area and adjoining parts of Gloucestershire and Somerset Population >1m
Tees Valley	Ben Houchen	Conservatives	Former councillor in Stockton-on-Tees	Area of 307mi ² Population of 700,000
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough	James Palmer	Conservatives	Former East Cambridgeshire councillor	Area of 1176mi ² Population of 850,000 approx

Source: BBC News, Wikipedia, Toscafund

Even though it has six newly elected mayors there will be those who doubt whether devolution of economic controls across England will prove in any way significant. Many will see this recalcitrance as not the result of any fundamental opposition to devolution, but rather the belief that until the UK economy has been safely navigated into post-EU waters, fiscal management should be ceteris paribus in all other respects. To those making such claims I will repeat that the devolution of significant economic power around England will become a significant theme of coming years. I say so because the transfer of fiscal management to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly will accelerate from June 9th and comparability will demand that English regions are not “left behind”.

The European Union has frustrated our self-determination in such areas as trying to collectivise how we negotiate trade agreements. It has been no less frustrating to us wherever it has created a one-size-fits-all business framework. But collectivism only works when all those collected are homogenous. With this in mind we must ensure that not only are powers taken back from the EU devolved outwards around the UK, but those held by Westminster should be as well. After all, just as intra-EU collectivism has largely hampered the flexibility of the UK economy, so too has domestic collectivism. In short, as much as being unshackled from the EU will provide a net positive for the UK economy in aggregate, so will the decentralisation of power within the UK. This is not to claim that elected regional assemblies empowered with economic levers will always use them entirely wisely, but rather that devolution will create a degree of local accountability whilst also fostering healthy competition with their neighbours to attract financial and human capital.

Dr Savvas Savouri

Appendix 1 – Conservative Target Seats

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
1	City of Chester	0.2	Lab	43.1	43.2	5.6	na	na	8.1	na	na	42.7
2	Ealing Central and Acton	0.5	Lab	42.7	43.2	6.1	na	na	3.8	3.6	0.6	28.2
3	Berwickshire, RB and S	0.6	SNP	36.0	4.9	18.7	36.6	na	2.4	1.1	0.2	43.2
4	Ynys Môn	0.7	Lab	21.2	31.1	2.2	na	30.5	14.7	na	0.4	50.9
5	Brentford and Isleworth	0.8	Lab	42.9	43.8	4.0	na	na	5.6	3.7	na	39.5
6	Halifax	1.0	Lab	39.0	40.0	3.7	na	na	12.8	2.6	1.8	60.4
7	Wirral West	1.0	Lab	44.2	45.1	3.4	na	na	6.6	na	0.7	42.8
8	Ilford North	1.2	Lab	42.7	43.9	2.3	na	na	8.9	2.1	0.2	52.6
9	Newcastle-under-Lyme	1.5	Lab	36.9	38.4	4.2	na	na	16.9	2.9	0.7	61.7
10	Barrow and Furness	1.8	Lab	40.5	42.3	2.7	na	na	11.7	2.5	0.3	56.8
11	Wolverhampton South West	2.0	Lab	41.2	43.2	2.1	na	na	10.7	2.6	0.1	53.6
12	Hampstead and Kilburn	2.1	Lab	42.3	44.4	5.6	na	na	2.8	4.4	0.4	23.5
13	Enfield North	2.4	Lab	41.4	43.7	2.3	na	na	9.0	2.8	0.8	47.9
14	Hove	2.4	Lab	39.9	42.3	3.6	na	na	6.3	6.8	1.1	33.9
15	Dewsbury	2.7	Lab	39.1	41.8	3.6	na	na	12.4	2.5	0.6	57.3
16	Southport	3.0	LD	28.0	19.2	31.0	na	na	16.8	2.8	2.2	45.5
17	Lancaster and Fleetwood	3.0	Lab	39.2	42.3	3.3	na	na	9.7	5.0	0.4	50.9
18	Carshalton and Wallington	3.2	LD	31.7	15.0	34.9	na	na	14.8	3.1	0.5	56.3
19	North East Derbyshire	3.9	Lab	36.7	40.6	4.2	na	na	15.9	2.2	0.3	62.2
20	Harrow West	4.7	Lab	42.2	47.0	3.4	na	na	4.4	2.8	0.3	41.4
21	Bridgend	4.9	Lab	32.2	37.1	4.2	na	7.1	15.0	1.9	2.7	49.7
22	Middlesbrough S and EC	5.0	Lab	37.1	42.0	3.4	na	na	15.2	2.3	na	65.0
23	Westminster North	5.0	Lab	41.8	46.8	3.7	na	na	3.8	3.3	0.5	33.0
24	Walsall North	5.3	Lab	33.8	39.0	2.3	na	na	22.0	1.4	1.5	71.9
25	Tooting	5.3	Lab	41.9	47.2	3.9	na	na	2.9	4.1	na	25.3
26	Wrexham	5.6	Lab	31.6	37.2	5.3	na	7.6	15.5	2.0	0.6	57.3
27	Birmingham, Northfield	5.9	Lab	35.7	41.6	3.2	na	na	16.7	2.8	na	57.5
28	Wakefield	6.1	Lab	34.2	40.3	3.5	na	na	18.3	2.5	1.3	62.0
29	Gedling	6.2	Lab	36.1	42.3	4.0	na	na	14.4	3.2	na	56.2
30	Eltham	6.2	Lab	36.4	42.6	3.0	na	na	15.0	3.0	na	52.8
31	Copeland	6.5	Lab	35.8	42.3	3.5	na	na	15.5	3.0	na	59.8
32	Stoke-on-Trent South	6.5	Lab	32.7	39.2	3.3	na	na	21.2	2.6	1.0	70.8
33	Birmingham, Edgbaston	6.6	Lab	38.3	44.8	2.9	na	na	10.1	3.3	0.6	43.2
34	East Renfrewshire	6.6	SNP	22.0	34.0	1.9	40.6	na	1.6	na	na	25.7
35	Leeds North West	6.7	LD	18.6	30.1	36.8	na	na	6.9	7.0	0.6	35.4
36	Clwyd South	6.9	Lab	30.4	37.2	3.8	na	10.3	15.6	2.6	na	60.3

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
37	Coventry South	7.3	Lab	35.0	42.3	4.1	na	na	13.1	3.9	1.7	48.9
38	Hartlepool	7.7	Lab	20.9	35.6	1.9	na	na	28.0	3.4	10.1	69.6
39	Darlington	7.7	Lab	35.2	42.9	4.8	na	na	13.1	3.5	0.5	58.1
40	Clacton	7.8	UKIP	36.7	14.4	1.8	na	na	44.4	2.7	na	71.1
41	Delyn	7.8	Lab	32.7	40.5	3.7	na	4.8	16.4	1.8	na	54.8
42	Blackpool South	8.0	Lab	33.8	41.8	2.3	na	na	17.3	2.6	2.2	67.8
43	Alyn and Deeside	8.1	Lab	31.9	40.0	4.2	na	3.9	17.6	2.4	na	57.7
44	North Norfolk	8.2	LD	30.9	10.2	39.1	na	na	16.9	3.0	na	58.3
45	Scunthorpe	8.5	Lab	33.2	41.7	2.1	na	na	17.1	2.4	3.5	69.1
46	Bristol East	8.6	Lab	30.7	39.3	5.8	na	na	15.5	8.3	0.5	48.8
47	Newport West	8.7	Lab	32.5	41.2	3.9	na	4.0	15.2	3.2	na	53.0
48	Southampton, Test	8.7	Lab	32.5	41.3	4.9	na	na	12.8	5.9	2.7	50.7
49	Chorley	8.8	Lab	36.3	45.1	2.6	na	na	13.5	2.1	0.3	56.6
50	Bishop Auckland	8.9	Lab	32.5	41.4	4.4	na	na	17.8	3.9	na	60.6
51	Coventry North West	10.0	Lab	31.0	41.0	4.0	na	na	15.7	4.3	3.9	58.7
52	Bolton North East	10.1	Lab	32.8	43.0	2.9	na	na	18.8	2.6	na	57.8
53	Hyndburn	10.3	Lab	31.9	42.1	2.0	na	na	21.3	2.6	na	65.8
54	Bury South	10.4	Lab	34.6	45.1	3.6	na	na	13.3	3.0	0.4	54.5
55	Wirral South	11.0	Lab	37.2	48.2	3.5	na	na	8.9	2.1	na	45.6
56	Dudley North	11.0	Lab	30.8	41.8	1.3	na	na	24.0	1.4	0.8	69.2
57	Mansfield	11.3	Lab	28.2	39.4	3.5	na	na	25.1	3.1	0.7	70.9
58	Dumfries and Galloway	11.5	SNP	29.9	24.7	1.7	41.4	na	2.3	na	na	45.4
59	Dagenham and Rainham	11.6	Lab	24.4	41.4	1.7	na	na	29.8	1.9	0.8	69.9
60	Batley and Spen	12.0	Lab	31.2	43.2	4.7	na	na	18.0	2.4	0.3	60.4
61	Workington	12.2	Lab	30.1	42.3	4.4	na	na	19.6	3.0	0.5	60.3
62	Stoke-on-Trent North	12.5	Lab	27.4	39.9	2.9	na	na	24.7	2.8	2.2	72.1
63	West Aberdeenshire and K	12.7	SNP	28.8	4.5	21.4	41.6	na	1.8	1.6	0.3	38.6
64	Exeter	13.3	Lab	33.1	46.4	4.3	na	na	9.4	6.5	0.4	44.7
65	Newport East	13.4	Lab	27.3	40.7	6.4	na	3.5	18.4	2.5	1.1	60.3
66	Ellesmere Port and Neston	13.4	Lab	34.3	47.8	3.3	na	na	12.0	2.1	0.5	57.8
67	Great Grimsby	13.5	Lab	26.3	39.8	5.0	na	na	25.0	2.3	1.7	70.2
68	Oldham E and Saddleworth	13.5	Lab	25.9	39.4	12.9	na	na	19.2	2.6	na	57.3
69	Luton South	13.5	Lab	30.7	44.2	7.5	na	na	12.1	2.9	2.5	55.4
70	Hammersmith	13.6	Lab	36.4	50.0	4.6	na	na	4.4	4.4	0.2	31.0
71	Bristol South	14.0	Lab	24.3	38.4	8.7	na	na	16.5	11.5	0.6	49.7
72	York Central	14.1	Lab	28.3	42.4	8.0	na	na	10.1	10.0	1.2	38.5
73	Worsley and Eccles South	14.1	Lab	30.1	44.2	2.6	na	na	18.3	3.0	1.8	61.4
74	Carmarthen E and Dinefwr	14.2	PC	21.2	24.2	2.4	na	38.4	11.1	2.8	na	53.8

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
75	Penistone and Stocksbridge	14.3	Lab	27.7	42.0	6.3	na	na	22.9	na	1.1	61.3
76	Walsall South	14.4	Lab	32.8	47.2	1.6	na	na	15.6	2.7	na	63.6
77	Brighton, Pavilion	14.6	Gre	22.8	27.3	2.8	na	na	5.0	41.8	0.4	25.7
78	Birmingham, Erdington	14.8	Lab	30.8	45.6	2.8	na	na	17.4	2.7	0.6	57.5
79	Aberdeen South	14.9	SNP	22.8	26.8	4.6	41.6	na	1.8	2.0	0.3	32.3
80	Leeds North East	15.0	Lab	32.9	47.9	5.3	na	na	7.7	5.3	0.9	37.3

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>

Appendix 2 – Liberal Democrats Seats and Targets

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
	Westmorland and Lonsdale	18.3	LD	33.2	5.4	51.5	na	na	6.2	3.7	na	47.5
	Ceredigion	8.2	LD	11.0	9.7	35.9	na	27.7	10.2	5.6	na	45.4
	North Norfolk	8.2	LD	30.9	10.2	39.1	na	na	16.9	3.0	na	58.3
	Leeds North West	6.7	LD	18.6	30.1	36.8	na	na	6.9	7.0	0.6	35.4
	Sheffield, Hallam	4.2	LD	13.6	35.8	40.0	na	na	6.4	3.2	0.9	35.9
	Orkney and Shetland	3.6	LD	8.9	7.1	41.4	37.8	na	4.8	na	na	40.3
	Carshalton and Wallington	3.2	LD	31.7	15.0	34.9	na	na	14.8	3.1	0.5	56.3
	Southport	3.0	LD	28.0	19.2	31.0	na	na	16.8	2.8	2.2	45.5
1	Cambridge	1.2	Lab	15.7	36.0	34.9	na	na	5.2	7.9	0.4	26.5
2	Eastbourne	1.4	Con	39.6	7.8	38.2	na	na	11.6	2.6	0.3	57.6
3	Lewes	2.1	Con	38.0	9.9	35.9	na	na	10.7	5.5	na	47.0
4	Thornbury and Yate	3.1	Con	41.0	7.8	37.9	na	na	10.6	2.7	na	53.3
5	Twickenham	3.3	Con	41.3	11.5	38.0	na	na	4.9	4.0	0.3	33.7
6	East Dunbartonshire	3.9	SNP	8.6	12.3	36.3	40.3	na	1.0	1.5	na	26.7
7	Kingston and Surbiton	4.8	Con	39.2	14.5	34.5	na	na	7.3	3.9	0.6	41.6
8	St Ives	5.1	Con	38.3	9.3	33.2	na	na	11.8	6.3	1.1	55.1
9	Edinburgh West	5.9	SNP	12.3	11.7	33.1	39.0	na	1.9	2.1	na	29.0
10	Torbay	6.8	Con	40.7	8.7	33.8	na	na	13.6	3.2	na	62.7
11	Sutton and Cheam	7.9	Con	41.5	11.1	33.7	na	na	10.7	2.1	0.8	51.3
12	Bath	8.1	Con	37.8	13.2	29.7	na	na	6.2	11.9	1.2	31.7
13	Burnley	8.2	Lab	13.5	37.6	29.5	na	na	17.3	2.1	na	66.6
14	Bermondsey and Old S	8.7	Lab	11.8	43.1	34.3	na	na	6.3	3.9	0.6	27.0
15	Yeovil	9.3	Con	42.5	7.1	33.1	na	na	13.4	3.8	na	59.3
16	North East Fife	9.6	SNP	16.3	7.7	31.3	40.9	na	na	3.1	0.7	38.1
17	Caithness, Sutherland and ER	11.2	SNP	6.8	9.0	35.1	46.3	na	2.9	na	na	49.4
18	Colchester	11.5	Con	38.9	16.2	27.5	na	na	12.1	5.1	0.2	51.1
19	Cheltenham	12.1	Con	46.1	7.3	34.0	na	na	7.1	5.0	0.5	42.8
20	Cheadle	12.2	Con	43.1	16.3	31.0	na	na	8.3	na	1.3	41.9
21	Berwick-upon-Tweed	12.2	Con	41.1	14.9	28.9	na	na	11.2	3.7	0.2	55.6
22	Ross, Skye and Lochaber	12.3	SNP	6.2	4.9	35.9	48.1	na	1.9	2.5	0.5	43.4
23	Portsmouth South	12.5	Con	34.8	19.5	22.3	na	na	13.4	7.5	2.5	48.9
24	Brecon and Radnorshire	12.7	Con	41.1	14.7	28.3	na	4.4	8.3	3.1	na	51.7
25	Cardiff Central	12.9	Lab	14.7	40.0	27.1	na	5.0	6.5	6.4	0.4	30.4
26	North Devon	13.3	Con	42.7	7.1	29.4	na	na	14.8	5.8	0.3	57.0
27	Wells	13.3	Con	46.1	6.6	32.8	na	na	9.9	4.1	0.4	53.5
28	North Cornwall	13.7	Con	45.0	5.4	31.2	na	na	12.7	4.3	1.4	60.3

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
29	Gordon	14.9	SNP	11.7	5.9	32.7	47.7	na	2.0	na	na	44.6
30	Hazel Grove	15.2	Con	41.4	17.5	26.2	na	na	12.2	2.6	na	51.4
31	Montgomeryshire	15.8	Con	45.0	5.6	29.3	na	5.2	11.2	3.7	na	56.0
32	Birmingham, Yardley	16.0	Lab	14.0	41.6	25.6	na	na	16.1	1.7	1.0	61.3
33	St Austell and Newquay	16.2	Con	40.2	10.2	24.0	na	na	16.9	4.6	4.1	63.5
34	Argyll and Bute	16.3	SNP	14.9	10.4	27.9	44.3	na	2.5	na	na	39.4
35	Eastleigh	16.5	Con	42.3	12.9	25.8	na	na	15.8	2.7	0.4	54.0
36	Oxford West and Abingdon	16.7	Con	45.7	12.7	28.9	na	na	6.9	4.4	1.4	38.2
37	Bristol West	8.8	Lab	15.2	35.7	18.8	na	na	3.0	26.8	0.5	20.4
38	Bradford East	17.1	Lab	11.3	46.6	29.5	na	na	9.9	2.1	0.5	57.9
39	Berwickshire, RB and S	0.6	SNP	36.0	4.9	18.7	36.6	na	2.4	1.1	0.2	43.2
40	Chippenham	18.2	Con	47.6	8.2	29.4	na	na	10.6	4.2	na	52.3
41	Inverness, N, B and S	18.8	SNP	5.9	7.5	31.3	50.1	na	2.1	2.4	0.7	41.4
42	Hornsey and Wood Green	19.1	Lab	9.3	50.9	31.8	na	na	2.2	5.4	0.4	18.5

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>

Appendix 3 – SNP Position

Rank	Constituency	SNP margin	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	UKIP	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave
1	Edinburgh South	-5.4	Lab	17.5	39.1	3.7	33.8	1.2	4.2	0.4	23.6
2	Orkney and Shetland	-3.6	LD	8.9	7.1	41.4	37.8	4.8	na	na	40.3
3	Dumfriesshire, C and T	-1.5	Con	39.8	14.8	2.7	38.3	2.8	1.6	na	43.9
4	Berwickshire, RB and S	0.6	SNP	36.0	4.9	18.7	36.6	2.4	1.1	0.2	43.2
5	East Dunbartonshire	3.9	SNP	8.6	12.3	36.3	40.3	1.0	1.5	na	26.7
6	Edinburgh West	5.9	SNP	12.3	11.7	33.1	39.0	1.9	2.1	na	29.0
7	East Renfrewshire	6.6	SNP	22.0	34.0	1.9	40.6	1.6	na	na	25.7
8	North East Fife	9.6	SNP	16.3	7.7	31.3	40.9	na	3.1	0.7	38.1
9	Edinburgh North and Leith	9.6	SNP	16.2	31.3	4.5	40.9	1.5	5.4	0.2	19.4
10	Caithness, Sutherland and ER	11.2	SNP	6.8	9.0	35.1	46.3	2.9	na	na	49.4
11	Dumfries and Galloway	11.5	SNP	29.9	24.7	1.7	41.4	2.3	na	na	45.4
12	East Lothian	11.5	SNP	19.5	31.0	2.6	42.5	2.0	2.1	0.3	35.4
13	Ross, Skye and Lochaber	12.3	SNP	6.2	4.9	35.9	48.1	1.9	2.5	0.5	43.4
14	Paisley and Renfrewshire S	12.3	SNP	7.6	38.6	2.2	50.9	na	na	0.6	34.2
15	West Aberdeenshire and K	12.7	SNP	28.8	4.5	21.4	41.6	1.8	1.6	0.3	38.6
16	Aberdeen South	14.9	SNP	22.8	26.8	4.6	41.6	1.8	2.0	0.3	32.3
17	Gordon	14.9	SNP	11.7	5.9	32.7	47.7	2.0	na	na	44.6
18	Edinburgh South West	15.8	SNP	20.2	27.2	3.7	43.0	2.1	3.8	na	26.9
19	Argyll and Bute	16.3	SNP	14.9	10.4	27.9	44.3	2.5	na	na	39.4
20	Rutherglen and Hamilton W	17.3	SNP	7.6	35.2	1.8	52.6	2.3	na	0.6	37.3
21	Ochil and South Perthshire	17.6	SNP	20.7	28.4	2.6	46.0	2.3	na	na	39.3
22	Perth and North Perthshire	17.8	SNP	32.7	8.1	3.8	50.5	2.0	2.1	0.7	40.2
23	Paisley and Renfrewshire N	18.0	SNP	12.3	32.7	2.1	50.7	na	1.4	0.8	36.1
24	Lanark and Hamilton East	18.3	SNP	15.9	30.5	2.2	48.8	2.6	na	na	35.5
25	Moray	18.4	SNP	31.1	9.9	2.8	49.5	3.9	2.7	na	49.9
26	Dunfermline and West Fife	18.5	SNP	11.9	31.7	4.0	50.3	na	2.1	na	40.0
27	Inverness, N,B and S	18.8	SNP	5.9	7.5	31.3	50.1	2.1	2.4	0.7	41.4
28	Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	18.9	SNP	9.9	33.4	2.2	52.2	2.3	na	na	41.7
29	Edinburgh East	19.3	SNP	9.9	29.9	2.8	49.2	1.9	6.0	0.2	30.5
30	Glasgow Central	19.5	SNP	6.0	33.1	1.6	52.5	2.0	4.0	0.9	28.0
31	Airdrie and Shotts	19.8	SNP	7.7	34.1	1.5	53.9	2.5	na	0.3	40.1
32	Stirling	20.1	SNP	23.1	25.5	2.7	45.6	na	3.1	na	32.3
33	Midlothian	20.4	SNP	11.9	30.2	2.3	50.6	2.4	2.5	na	37.9
34	Linlithgow and East Falkirk	21.0	SNP	12.0	31.0	2.0	52.0	2.7	na	0.2	41.6
35	Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock	21.6	SNP	19.8	27.3	1.6	48.8	2.5	na	na	43.0
36	Coatbridge, Chryston and B	22.7	SNP	6.3	33.9	1.1	56.6	2.1	na	na	38.7

Rank	Constituency	SNP margin	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	UKIP	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave
37	Glasgow North West	23.6	SNP	8.4	30.9	2.7	54.5	na	2.7	0.8	30.0
38	Glasgow South West	24.3	SNP	5.0	32.8	1.0	57.2	2.4	1.2	0.4	39.4
39	Glasgow North East	24.4	SNP	4.7	33.7	0.8	58.1	na	1.6	1.2	37.7
40	Glasgow East	24.5	SNP	6.0	32.4	0.7	56.9	2.6	0.9	0.5	44.0
41	Motherwell and Wishaw	24.7	SNP	7.7	31.9	1.2	56.5	2.7	na	na	37.0
42	Inverclyde	24.8	SNP	10.0	30.3	2.5	55.1	1.6	na	0.5	36.2
43	Glasgow South	25.2	SNP	9.7	29.7	2.1	54.9	na	2.9	0.6	28.7
44	Glasgow North	25.2	SNP	7.9	27.9	2.7	53.1	1.3	6.2	0.9	27.7
45	North Ayrshire and Arran	25.2	SNP	14.8	28.0	1.7	53.2	2.4	na	na	42.3
46	Angus	25.2	SNP	29.0	8.8	2.7	54.2	3.0	2.2	na	48.1
47	Kilmarnock and Loudoun	25.3	SNP	12.5	30.4	1.5	55.7	na	na	na	39.6
48	Na h-Eileanan an Iar	25.7	SNP	7.6	28.6	2.9	54.3	na	na	6.6	44.8
49	Central Ayrshire	26.8	SNP	17.3	26.4	1.8	53.2	na	1.3	na	42.7
50	East Kilbride, S and L	27.3	SNP	11.8	28.3	1.7	55.6	2.0	na	0.5	38.0
51	West Dunbartonshire	27.7	SNP	7.0	31.3	1.6	59.0	na	na	1.0	38.0
52	Glenrothes	29.2	SNP	7.7	30.6	1.9	59.8	na	na	na	46.5
53	Livingston	29.3	SNP	10.3	27.6	2.1	56.9	3.1	na	na	43.8
54	Cumbernauld, Kilsyth KE	29.9	SNP	7.9	30.0	2.2	59.9	na	na	na	37.9
55	Aberdeen North	30.5	SNP	12.1	25.9	4.7	56.4	na	na	0.9	43.1
56	Banff and Buchan	31.4	SNP	28.8	5.8	5.1	60.2	na	na	na	54.0
57	Falkirk	32.6	SNP	12.1	25.1	2.0	57.7	3.0	na	na	42.0
58	Dundee West	38.2	SNP	8.6	23.7	2.4	61.9	na	2.7	0.7	41.2
59	Dundee East	39.8	SNP	15.0	19.9	2.9	59.7	na	1.9	0.7	38.3

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>

Appendix 4- UKIP

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	UKIP (%)	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	PC (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
1	Clacton	7.8	UKIP	44.4	36.7	14.4	1.8	na	2.7	na	71.1
2	Boston and Skegness	10.0	Con	33.8	43.8	16.5	2.3	na	1.8	1.7	75.0
3	South Thanet	5.7	Con	32.4	38.1	23.8	1.9	na	2.2	1.6	61.6
4	Heywood and Middleton	10.9	Lab	32.2	19.1	43.1	3.3	na	2.3	na	62.2
5	Thurrock	1.1	Con	31.7	33.7	32.6	1.3	na	na	0.7	70.3
6	Castle Point	19.7	Con	31.2	50.9	13.8	1.8	na	2.4	na	72.7
7	Rochester and Strood	13.6	Con	30.5	44.1	19.8	2.4	na	2.9	0.4	63.1
8	Rotherham	22.3	Lab	30.2	12.3	52.5	2.9	na	na	2.1	68.2
9	Dagenham and Rainham	11.6	Lab	29.8	24.4	41.4	1.7	na	1.9	0.8	69.9
10	Rother Valley	15.5	Lab	28.1	23.3	43.6	4.2	na	na	0.8	66.9
11	Hartlepool	7.7	Lab	28.0	20.9	35.6	1.9	na	3.4	10.1	69.6
12	South Basildon and East T	16.9	Con	26.5	43.4	25.2	3.0	na	na	1.9	73.1
13	North Thanet	23.3	Con	25.7	49.0	17.9	3.5	na	3.7	0.3	65.0
14	Hornchurch and Upminster	23.7	Con	25.3	49.0	20.1	2.7	na	2.6	0.3	69.5
15	West Bromwich West	22.1	Lab	25.2	23.9	47.3	1.6	na	2.0	na	69.1
16	Mansfield	11.3	Lab	25.1	28.2	39.4	3.5	na	3.1	0.7	70.9
17	Great Grimsby	13.5	Lab	25.0	26.3	39.8	5.0	na	2.3	1.7	70.2
18	Wentworth and Dearne	32.0	Lab	24.9	14.9	56.9	2.6	na	na	0.7	70.7
19	Sittingbourne and Sheppey	24.6	Con	24.8	49.5	19.6	3.2	na	2.4	0.6	65.8
20	Stoke-on-Trent North	12.5	Lab	24.7	27.4	39.9	2.9	na	2.8	2.2	72.1
21	Doncaster Central	25.0	Lab	24.1	20.7	49.1	4.2	na	na	1.8	66.3
22	Bradford South	17.2	Lab	24.1	26.3	43.4	2.9	na	3.3	na	62.7
23	Dudley North	11.0	Lab	24.0	30.8	41.8	1.3	na	1.4	0.8	69.2
24	Bolton South East	26.8	Lab	23.6	20.3	50.5	2.6	na	2.9	na	63.4
25	Barnsley East	31.2	Lab	23.5	14.6	54.7	3.2	na	na	4.0	70.8
26	Don Valley	20.9	Lab	23.5	25.3	46.2	3.5	na	na	1.6	68.6
27	South West Norfolk	27.7	Con	23.3	50.9	17.3	4.4	na	4.1	na	66.3
28	Great Yarmouth	13.8	Con	23.1	42.9	29.1	2.3	na	2.2	0.4	71.5
29	Penistone and Stocksbridge	14.3	Lab	22.9	27.7	42.0	6.3	na	na	1.1	61.3
30	Romford	28.2	Con	22.8	51.0	20.9	2.9	na	2.5	na	67.8
31	Folkestone and Hythe	25.1	Con	22.8	47.9	14.4	8.9	na	5.4	0.7	61.8
32	Stoke-on-Trent Central	16.7	Lab	22.7	22.5	39.3	4.2	na	3.6	7.7	65.0
33	Doncaster North	29.8	Lab	22.6	18.3	52.4	2.5	na	1.9	2.2	72.1
34	North East Cambridgeshire	32.6	Con	22.5	55.1	14.4	4.5	na	3.5	na	69.4
35	Makerfield	29.4	Lab	22.4	19.5	51.8	3.7	na	2.5	na	65.0
36	Kingston upon Hull East	29.4	Lab	22.4	15.9	51.7	6.5	na	2.3	1.2	72.6

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	UKIP (%)	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	PC (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
37	Blyth Valley	24.0	Lab	22.3	21.7	46.3	5.9	na	3.8	na	59.9
38	Rayleigh and Wickford	32.4	Con	22.3	54.7	12.6	3.0	na	2.9	4.5	67.9
39	Barking	35.5	Lab	22.2	16.3	57.7	1.3	na	2.1	0.4	60.3
40	Sheffield, Brightside and H	34.5	Lab	22.1	11.0	56.6	4.5	na	4.3	1.5	61.4
41	Walsall North	5.3	Lab	22.0	33.8	39.0	2.3	na	1.4	1.5	71.9
42	South Shields	29.3	Lab	22.0	16.6	51.3	1.8	na	4.5	3.9	62.8
43	Sheffield South East	29.5	Lab	21.9	17.4	51.4	5.3	na	2.7	1.3	66.5
44	South Holland and Deepings	37.7	Con	21.8	59.6	12.4	3.0	na	3.2	na	71.2
45	Ashton-under-Lyne	27.6	Lab	21.8	22.1	49.8	2.4	na	3.9	na	63.5
46	Buckingham	42.7	na	21.7	na	na	na	na	13.8	64.5	48.7
47	Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	29.6	Con	21.7	51.3	13.8	9.0	na	4.1	na	64.2
48	West Suffolk	30.4	Con	21.7	52.2	17.5	5.0	na	3.6	na	63.3
49	Barnsley Central	34.0	Lab	21.7	15.0	55.7	2.1	na	2.6	2.9	68.4
50	Houghton and Sunderland S	33.6	Lab	21.5	18.5	55.1	2.1	na	2.8	na	64.7
51	Plymouth, Moor View	2.4	Con	21.5	37.6	35.2	3.0	na	2.4	0.4	68.8
52	Christchurch	36.7	Con	21.5	58.1	9.5	6.6	na	4.3	na	59.9
53	Louth and Horncastle	29.8	Con	21.4	51.2	18.0	4.5	na	3.1	1.8	69.4
54	Ashfield	18.6	Lab	21.4	22.4	41.0	14.8	na	na	0.3	70.6
55	Hyndburn	10.3	Lab	21.3	31.9	42.1	2.0	na	2.6	na	65.8
56	Normanton, Pontefract C	33.6	Lab	21.3	20.8	54.9	2.9	na	na	na	70.8
57	Stoke-on-Trent South	6.5	Lab	21.2	32.7	39.2	3.3	na	2.6	1.0	70.8
58	West Bromwich East	25.3	Lab	21.2	24.9	50.2	2.0	na	1.7	na	67.6
59	Isle of Wight	19.5	Con	21.2	40.7	12.8	7.4	na	13.4	4.5	61.9
60	Bexleyheath and Crayford	21.0	Con	21.0	47.3	26.2	3.0	na	2.2	0.3	65.0
61	Bolsover	26.8	Lab	21.0	24.5	51.2	3.3	na	na	na	70.3
62	Spelthorne	28.8	Con	20.9	49.7	18.6	6.4	na	3.5	0.9	60.3
63	Oldham West and Royton	34.2	Lab	20.6	19.0	54.8	3.7	na	1.9	na	62.7
64	Havant	31.1	Con	20.6	51.7	15.9	6.5	na	5.2	na	62.5
65	Rochford and Southend East	21.7	Con	20.5	46.4	24.7	3.3	na	5.0	na	60.5
66	Wolverhampton South East	31.0	Lab	20.3	22.3	53.3	2.3	na	1.7	na	68.8
67	Dover	12.5	Con	20.3	43.3	30.7	3.1	na	2.6	na	63.1
68	Hemsworth	28.5	Lab	20.2	22.9	51.3	3.2	na	na	2.4	67.5
69	North West Cambridgeshire	32.4	Con	20.1	52.5	17.9	5.7	na	3.5	0.3	57.0

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>

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